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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PAT WHITE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
PAUL BLACKBURN, Bishop of
the Taylorsville 43rd Ward of
the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints; THE
TAYLORSVILLE 43rd WARD OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, and THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, unincorporated associations,

Case No. 88-0232

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court
In and for Salt Lake County
The Hon. John A. Rokich, Judge Presiding

THE DEFENDANTS-REPONDENTS, by and through their counsel
of record, Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, and Allen M. Swan,
respectfully submit the following BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS in the
above captioned matter.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Respondents agree to the Statement of Issues set forth in
the Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Defendants-Respondents agree there are no determinative
constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or rules and
regulations.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiff's Statement of Case set forth in her brief
omits several essential facts which are undisputed and which
more correctly set forth the circumstances out of which this
litigation grew.

Michael Chandler, 17 year old son of Plaintiff

Pat White, made several approaches for Church assistance to
Bishop Paul Blackburn, a newly called Bishop of the Taylorsville
43rd Ward in Salt Lake County, Utah, stating that there were
some problems at home in that his relationship) with his
stepfather was not a good one and that he had been both verbally
and physically abused by the stepfather and that his mother,
Plaintiff herein, was agreeable to his getting out of the home
environment.
Bishop Blackburn insisted on permission from the mother
before he would agree to giving Church aid for Chandler's
returning to North Carolina where he had previously lived.

The

alleged purposes of of the trip were to finish high school in
-2-

that area and bring his brother, who had some problems with the
law, back to Utah with him.

He was told by Chandler not to

contact the mother at home because this would result in some
"hurt" to his mother or himself from the stepfather.
After the mother failed to contact the Bishop and on
receiving her telephone number at work, the Bishop attempted to
contact her, but he asked for "Pat Chandler" and was told that
there was no one at the store by that name.
attempt to telephone the mother at work.

He made no further

Finally, after

persistent requests by Chandler, Bishop Blackburn said he would
give the requested financial assistance if Mrs. White either
telephoned him or gave written permission.

Thereafter he was

given a note purportedly executed by the mother, but which,
unbeknown to the Bishop, had been forged by Chandler, and which
note gave the consent which the Bishop had made a condition of
Church assistance.
The Bishop's wife, Julie Blackburn, was party to a
telephone conversation with a Mrs. Barney in the State of North
Carolina and had verified that the boy would be welcome to stay
with the Barneys and would be treated as one of their own family
while he was completing his high school education in that
state.

This information was conveyed by Mrs. Blackburn to her

husband prior to his writing a check to the airlines.

-3-

Upon discovering that her son had gone to North Carolina
with Church assistance, Plaintiff had a telephone conversation
with Bishop Blackburn as a result of which Plaintiff was
offended because Bishop Blackburn told her that the Church would
not seek reimbursement for the plane fare from the Whites.
felt that the Bishop was cold.

She

Efforts to placate Plaintiff by

Bishop Blackburn and President Luker, Stake President of the
Taylorsville North Stake, were unsuccessful, Plaintiff having
sought out an attorney and having been advised by counsel not to
speak further with Church representatives.
Plaintiff commenced this action against the bishop of the
local Ward and the general Church alleging (1) intentional
interference with the parent-child relationship; (2) intentional
infliction of emotional distress; (3) negligent infliction of
emotional distress; (4) clerical malpractice; and (5)
negligence.

Defendants moved for Summary Judgment of Dismissal

and Plaintiff filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
with respect to liability.

The court granted Defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment with respect to all causes of action and
Mrs. White has appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Blackburn who was 28 years of age at the time
of the incident giving rise to this lawsuit (born June 20, 1957)
received a BS Degree in Nursing at the University of Utah,
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(Blackburn Deposition, p. 10)

commenced working as a male nurse

at the Eye Institute of Utah in December of 1983 (Blackburn
Deposition, p. 15) and at the time of his deposition in May of
1987 was the coordinator for FHP Redwood Out-Patient Surgery
Center (Blackburn Deposition, p. 9 ) . On the division of the
17th Ward of the Taylorsville Stake, Blackburn was called as
Bishop of the Taylorsville 43rd Ward in February of 1986.
(Blackburn Deposition, P. 40)
Prior to the incident which resulted in this lawsuit
Blackburn did not know of the existence of Pat White or any of
the other family members except for Mike Chandler, the 17 year
old, who came to the Bishop's home in late April or early May
1986 and talked to the Bishop in his living room. (Blackburn
Deposition, p. 45)

Chandler explained that his mother was

having some medical problems and would probably need Church
assistance in the future but that her immediate concern was that
he get out of the environment of the home because there were
some problems between him and his stepfather and that his
stepfather had been abusive to him as well as his mother, both
physically and verbally, and that he had a brother in North
Carolina who had just gotten out of some kind of prison or
juvenile hall and that he wanted to go back and bring the
brother to Salt Lake and that he needed assistance to get there
(Blackburn Deposition, p. 46).

-5-

In this initial conversation Blackburn responded that he
was not prepared to help the young man without some kind of
confirmation from his mother or his father that it was all right
and that Chandler would have to have his mother contact him and
give her permission, or if he didn't feel comfortable in doing
that, the Bishop would be happy to call her and talk to her.
Chandler told the Bishop that because of the situation at home
if his father found out anything about what was going on from
phone calls his father would "hurt" his mother or him.
(Blackburn Deposition, pp. 47, 48). Bishop Blackburn further
recalled that during the initial conversation Chandler mentioned
something about finishing his schooling in North Carolina, that
he had contacted some friends back there with whom he would be
staying while he finished his schooling and that following his
schooling he was prepared to enter the U.S. Army (Blackburn
Deposition, pp. 49, 50). The Bishop asked Chandler his age and
learned that "he would be 18 soon" and would be going into the
Army.

The Bishop said that he would have to have permission

from Chandler's parents before he could proceed and asked
Chandler to have his mother call him.

Bishop Blackburn did not

remember whether he received a work phone number as well as a
home phone number at that time, but he informed Chandler that he
needed to talk to his mother (Blackburn Deposition, pp. 50,
51).

Initially it was understood that Mrs. White would contact
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the Bishop but that the Bishop was not to contact the mother
because of "problems that would erupt at home" if he did
(Blackburn Deposition, p. 51).
The next contact occurred early one morning as Bishop
Blackburn was preparing to leave for work (Blackburn Deposition,
p. 52), a Friday of the same week in which the initial contact
had been made.

No effort had been made by Bishop Blackburn to

contact the mother because of the understanding that the mother
would contact him (Blackburn Deposition, p. 52). Blackburn
reiterated to Chandler that he could not act until he had
confirmation from Chandler's mother that it was all right to
proceed which upset Chandler because he wanted to leave on the
bus that afternoon (Blackburn Deposition, p. 53).
On the ensuing Saturday night Blackburn had further
contact with Chandler at which time Chandler informed the Bishop
that he had checked into airline reservations and informed the
Bishop how much the trip would cost (Blackburn Deposition, p.
54).

Blackburn reiterated that he could do nothing "without

confirmation from his mother one way or another whether this
could take place" (Blackburn Deposition, p. 54). On the
Saturday afternoon Blackburn learned from his wife, Julie, that
Chandler had been to the house and that Mrs. Blackburn had
talked to the people with whom Chandler was going to be staying
in North Carolina and had gotten confirmation from them that it
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was all right for him to stay there (Blackburn Deposition, p.
56).

Mrs. Blackburn had taken the phone number of the people in

North Carolina and she told her husband that he was welcome to
call them if he needed to do so (Blackburn Deposition, p. 56).
Mrs. Blackburn was assured in the telephone conversation with
the Barneys that Michael would be welcome to stay with them and
that "he's just like our own son". (Julie Blackburn Deposition,
p. 18). Chandler further informed Mrs. Barney in Mrs.
Blackburn's presence when and where he would be arriving (Julie
Blackburn Deposition, p. 14).
On the Saturday evening when Chandler again contacted the
Bishop, he said something to him about the fact that his mother
was at home and she couldn't call the Bishop at which time
Bishop Blackburn suggested that if he couldn't call the mother
and she couldn't call him that he would accept a note signed by
her giving him permission to allow Chandler to make his trip
(Blackburn Deposition, p. 57). Bishop Blackburn had previously
tried to telephone Mike's mother at work because he had a work
number for Dan's (Foodtown) but when he called the number and
asked for "Pat" they said, "Pat who?", and the Bishop responded,
"Pat Chandler" and the store reported, "We don't have anybody
here by that name", and that was as far as the Bishop pursued
the conversation (Blackburn Deposition, p. 60).
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On Sunday morning Chandler arrived at the Church and met
Blackburn in the Bishop1s Office before 7:00 a.m. at which time
Chandler produced the note which gave permission from the mother
for the North Carolina trip (Blackburn Deposition, p. 64).
Blackburn read the note which stated that there were some
problems at home with the relationship with the father and some
medical expenses that the mother was anticipating would prevent
her from helping her son go to North Carolina and "would I
please help him with this".

The note further stated that the

mother would appreciate having assistance with medical problems
in the near future and that "I was welcome to come and visit her
at any time, or something along that line".

Blackburn threw the

note away sometime after Chandler left and it wasn't until he
returned home that night and talked to Mrs. White on the
telephone that he had "any worries about it" (Blackburn
Deposition, p. 65).

In this action it is admitted that the note

had been prepared and the signature of Mrs. White forged by
Chandler (See Chandler Affidavit, R. 180, If 29). Chandler was
assisted to the airport by Jorge Becerra, Priest Quorum Advisor
in Chandler's former Ward (Taylorsville 17th).

Becerra had

inquired of Chandler while he was driving him to the airport
where he got the money for the plane ticket and Chandler showed
Becerra the check from Bishop Blackburn (Chandler Affidavit,
R. 181, 1T 36) .
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Chandler upon arriving in North Carolina stayed with the
Barneys for a week and then with a family named Fenton but there
was some trouble about staying there, resulting in Chandler
staying a couple of nights out of doors.

He never enrolled in

high school in North Carolina (Chandler Affidavit, p. 182,
IT 39).
Bishop Blackburn had had no training, either as a father
or in the capacity as an Elder's Quorum President (in which
capacity Bishop Blackburn had previously served), which would
"aid in deciphering whether or not a teenage kid like Mike
Chandler was lying" (Blackburn Deposition, p. 72). His
inservice training as a bishop provided no instruction with
respect to making judgments as to whether one of his
congregation was telling him the truth or lying and that in such
instances he relied upon what evidence was before him and his
own judgment tempered by the inspiration to which he believed he
was entitled as a Bishop.

(Blackburn Affidavit r e c , p. 24).

Within two days William Luker, President of the
Taylorsville North Central Stake, received a letter from Mrs.
White complaining of the incident.

Bishop Blackburn attempted

to contact Mrs. White and tell her he had acted in good faith
but could not reach her at home.

Knowing now that her full name

was "Pat White" he called the grocery store where she worked.
Mrs. White told Bishop Blackburn that the people in North
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Carolina could not register Mike without a guardianship and that
she had turned Michael in as a "run-away".

She further stated

that she had learned that the Whites would have to pay for
Michael's way home, at which time Bishop Blackburn offered to
pay the fare of Michael back to Utah, but Mrs. White responded,
"No, we'll let him sit there and learn a lesson"

(Blackburn

Affidavit, R. 27, 1f 12). Bishop Blackburn further offered to
assist in paying amounts which Michael had borrowed from others,
but Mrs. White stated, "That is not necessary, we will let Mike
take care of them"

(Blackburn Affidavit, R. 27, If 12).

Michael Chandler returned to Utah June 14, 1986, and
special arrangements were made for his high school graduation
which were successful

(Pat White Affidavit R. 80, H 19). He

was delayed in entering the U.S. Army approximately one month
(Chandler Affidavit, R. 182, If 40).
In her Affidavit, Plaintiff states that as a result of
Bishop Blackburn "helping" her son run away from home she
suffered terrible mental distress and emotional upheaval and
that her family and she were greatly disrupted for more than a
month while Michael was in North Carolina; that for a period of
several days after Mike left she did not know where he was and
was concerned for his safety and well being

(Pat White

Affidavit, R. 80, 11 19). Mrs. White suffered no out-of-pocket
expenses in connection with the incident, the Church unit in
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North Carolina having paid for Michael's transportation back to
Utah and there having been no tutoring costs, no loss of income
to the family as a result of Michael's absence, no money sent to
families in North Carolina who hosted Michael, and no medical
bills paid as a result of the incident (Pat White Deposition,
pp. 88-92), and although Mrs. White personally reimbursed a
friend of Michael's in the sum of $240.00 for money that Michael
had borrowed, Mrs. White was not asking the Church to reimburse
her for that sum (Pat White Deposition, p. 88).
Plaintiff knew as early as the Sunday afternoon when her
son left Salt Lake City, because she telephoned Mrs. Barney,
that the Barneys were expecting Michael and that Mrs. Blackburn,
the Bishop's wife, had asked if it was okay for Michael to come
and stay with them.

She was told that "Mike is always welcome

in our home, he is like part of the family".

At that time

Michael had not actually arrived but the Barneys were expecting
him.

Mrs. White told Mrs. Barney that she did not give her

permission for the trip and that she didn't know what to do and
that Mrs. Barney should call her if "she heard anything" (Pat
White Deposition, p. 49).
Later in the week Plaintiff again called Mrs. Barney and
learned that Michael had arrived but that he stayed with them
only one day, took off, and that he said that he was going to
see his brother who was with the Fentons (Pat White, Deposition,
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p. 50). Although Mrs. White apparently attempted to contact the
Fentons there was a lapse of approximately one week before she
got them.

When finally contacted, the Fentons confirmed that

Michael was with them.
was with the Fentons"

During that week Mrs. White "assumed he
(Pat White Deposition, p. 51).

Mrs.

White further testified that she had assumed during the entire
period that Michael was either with the Barneys or the Fentons
and "figured since nobody was calling and saying Michael is hurt
that at least he was safe" (Pat White Deposition, p. 52).
Michael ended up not going to school because he needed to
have special permission executed before a notary public and by
the time Mrs. White was able to get this to Pine Forest High in
North Carolina "it was too late" (Pat White Deposition, p. 43).
Mrs. White further testified that she did not have the Fentons
put Michael back on a plane to Salt Lake City because "I
couldn't ask them to pay for him to come back to Salt Lake City
and I didn't have the money and Brenda Ross at the Police
Department said to just let him stay there seeing as he was
going to be 18 in July" (Pat White Deposition, p. 53). Further
explaining this advice, Mrs. White testified, "Brenda Ross of
the West Valley Police Department told me that the only way he
could get back, she would turn him in as a run-away but I would
have to pay for it and I didn't have it".

Further, "I didn't

turn him in, I only discussed it with her.

She told me that

-13-

being as Michael was going to be 18 in July, if he was okay
where he was at, just to let him stay."

When asked if Fentons

were willing that Michael stay on with them, Mrs. White
testified that they were willing.
55).

(Pat White Deposition p. 54,

According to Mrs. White, Michael graduated from

Taylorsville High, received a diploma from that school, and was
able to do so with no special classes (Pat White Deposition, p.
55, 56).
Mrs. White testified that she had not talked to Michael
for a period of approximately eight days after he left Salt Lake
City (Pat White Deposition, p. 56); that she learned of the
forged note from her son Frank after Michael left (Pat White
Deposition, p. 58) and also from the Fentons when Michael had
apparently admitted to them the preparation of the note (Pat
White Deposition, p. 59). Mrs. White, in discussing her case
with her attorney, didn't remember whether she had brought up
the fact of the forgery or not.

When asked on her deposition

whether she had any doubt that there was a forged note she
responded, "No sir, I have not questioned that."

(Pat White

Deposition, p. 60).
Mrs. White further confirmed that Bishop Blackburn said
he had not called her at home because of the statement by Mike
that this would cause some harm to his mother if his stepfather
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knew.

She testified of the conversation with Bishop Blackburn

on the Sunday night of Mike's leaving as follows:
The night that Bishop Blackburn finally called, and it
took some doing before he finally called, at 7:00 that
night, and my first words were, ! Did you give my son
money to go to North Carolina?1, and he said, f Yes, I
did.1 And I said, ! Why? f and he said, 'Because your son
said his life was in danger and he also had a note signed
by you for him to go 1 , and I said, 'I did not write any
note', and he said, 'I realize that now', and I said,
'Why didn't you contact me if you were concerned, by
phone?' and he said, 'Because Michael also said that your
life was in danger", and I said, 'That is not true. In
that case, if you believed him why didn't you call the
proper authorities, if you believed my life was in
danger, why didn't you call the proper authorities and
have them check the story out?' He did not reply. The
next sentence to come out of his mouth was 'You don't
have to worry about paying me back or the Church for the
plane fare to North Carolina'
I was so stunned at that remark because he was so cold
during that whole conversation. I mean, if he would have
been more caring. He was almost cold. You know, like
when you talk to somebody and you almost get chills.
(Pat White Deposition, pp. 62, 63).
Although Bishop Blackburn and President Luker came to the
White home Mrs. White testified that because she had retained an
attorney there was some question as to whether she should even
talk to them (Pat White Deposition, p. 71). When questioned as
to whether she eventually ended up talking to either of them she
testified:
I went up and I heard Blackburn tell my husband when my
husband said that she doesn't want to talk to you,
Blackburn said that he wanted to hear it from her. I got
up from the couch and I went over and President Luker
introduced hisself to me and then he turned to Bishop
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Blackburn and he said f We would like to talk to you, if
possible.f
I said, 'Well, I would like to talk to you, but only in
the presence of my attorney. If you would like to set up
an appointment I would be more than happy to do that.f
The whole time Blackburn hadn't said anything to me and
only after that he said to me, f Is Michael all right? 1 ,
and I said, fSure he is. 1 And he said, 'Will you have
him call me?' And I said, 'Yes, I will.' Which I did
and I told Michael that Blackburn wanted him to call him.
(Pat White Deposition, p. 71, 72)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Church Defendants have never taken the position that
the doctrine of respondeat superior was inapplicable in this
case.

If Bishop Blackburn is liable on any of the theories

proposed by Plaintiff then it is conceded that the Bishop acted
within the scope of his authority.
Defendants contend, however, that the Plaintiff cannot
recover as a matter of law on any of her theories of liability.
Defendants maintain that there is no genuine issue with respect
to simple negligence, since even if such were found, there is no
genuine issue as to recoverable damages, Plaintiff having
conceded that the only damages she allegedly suffered consisted
of emotional distress.
The causes of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress and clerical malpractice cannot succeed
because this court has determined that only in certain
circumstances may a Plaintiff recover for emotional distress in
-16-

a simple negligence action and the conduct of the Defendants do
not meet the case law criteria nor does Bishop Blackburn's
conduct amount to "clerical malpractice" even if such a doctrine
exists within the State of Utah, which it does not.
Further, the theories of intentional interference with
parent-child relationship, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and "negligence per se" fail on the facts since the
Bishop's conduct did not rise to the level necessary to fit any
of these theories.

The Bishop's conduct did not consist of the

intentional doing of an act which he could reasonably foresee
would cause harm.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS CONCEDE THAT IF LIABILITY WERE PRESENT
THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR WOULD APPLY
The Defendants have never resisted liability on the basis

of the inapplicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The Church entities concede that Bishop Blackburn was acting
within the scope of his authority in the conduct of which
Plaintiff complains.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THIS CASE
The Defendants contend that even when viewed in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff White there are no genuine issues of
fact which would require a trial.

Assuming that Plaintiff's

case consists of the testimony in the depositions and affidavits
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of Plaintiff, her son, Michael, and the uncontroverted testimony
of Bishop Blackburn, his wife, and Jorge Becerra, this would be
a proper case for a directed verdict of nonsuit.

As stated in

Pakos v. Clark, 453 P.2d 682, (Ore., 1969)
If the minds of reasonable men would not
differ on the factual issues then the court
is obligated to grant an order of involuntary nonsuit.
Likewise, the same evidence, when made the basis for a
motion for summary judgment of dismissal, should result in a
granting of that motion.

The trial court correctly found that

reasonable minds could not differ as to whether the defendants1
conduct entitled plaintiff to recover under her various theories.
III.

PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP FAILS ON THE FACTS
The First Cause of Action alleges intentional

interference with parent-child relationship specifying that the
actions of Bishop Blackburn were "unjustifiable in that the
Defendant Blackburn had no authority or legitimate reason for
transporting the child to North Carolina".

The affidavits and

depositions establish beyond question that Bishop Blackburn was
acting in good faith and reasonably under the circumstances
since, after trying to contact Michael's mother (which efforts
were restricted by Michael's instructing the Bishop not to call
his mother at home), he requested a permission note which on its
face was signed by the mother, which later turned out to be a
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forgery.

No facts have been presented which would have put

Bishop Blackburn on notice that Michael was duping him with a
forged note.
The case of Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980)
discusses the import of the word "intentional".

In that case a

junior high school student had thrown a "tootsie-pop" (all-day
sucker) at a maintenance man from the second floor of the junior
high school inflicting physical damage.

The issue was whether

the act constituted an intentional assault and battery for which
the statute of limitations was one year, or could be viewed as
being reckless misconduct or reckless disregard for the safety
of others (negligence), which would extend the statute of
limitations to four years.

In the District Court a summary

judgment of dismissal had been granted, the court declaring that
the act constituted an assault and battery and was, therefore/
governed by the one year statute of limitations.

This court

reversed, holding that the act could constitute reckless
misconduct or reckless disregard for the safety of others.
Court quoted Restatement of Torts § 500 Comment (f):
Reckless misconduct differs from intentional
wrongdoing in a very important particular.
While an act to be reckless must be intended
by the actor, he does not intend to cause
the harm which results from it. It is
enough that he realizes, or from facts which
he knows, should realize that there is a
strong probability that harm may result,
even though he hopes or even expects that
his conduct will prove harmless. However, a
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The

strong probability is a different thing from
a substantial certainty without which he
cannot be said to intend the harm in which
his act results.
From the above it appears that for a person to intend the
harm in which his act results there must be a "substantial
certainty" that such conduct will, indeed, cause harm. In this
case there was no "substantial certainty" that harm would result
from assisting Michael to fly to North Carolina.
evidence discloses that no harm did result.

In fact, the

Michael graduated

from high school and entered the service as planned, the delay
of a few weeks was inconsequential and since Bishop Blackburn
assumed that Mrs. White had agreed to the temporary separation
when he was presented with the forged note, there was nothing to
indicate a substantial certainty of harm in the temporary
separation.

Neither purpose expressed to the Bishop, whether it

be that Michael was going to North Carolina to get his older
brother and bring him to Utah or that he was going to North
Carolina to finish high school where he would be free from the
oppressive conduct of his stepfather, created a "substantial
certainty of harm".
The case of Lloyd v. Loefler, 518 F.Supp. 720 (Wis. 1981)
is cited by Plaintiff.

In that case a summary judgment was

denied where grandparents were sued for the intentional
interference with a parent-child relationship and where the
facts indicated that the grandparents had conspired with their
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daughter and new son-in-law in violating a custody order to the
injury of the natural father.

Five separate acts of misconduct

were specified all of which required a full knowledge of the
facts and indicated an intention of the grandparents to
interfere with the parent-child relationship.

The distinction

between that case and ours is that Bishop Blackburn was not
given the facts.

The fact of the mother's unwillingness to let

the boy go to North Carolina was kept from him by the deceit of
Michael Chandler.

The defendants in Loefler knew their conduct

would interfere with plaintiff's parent-child relationship
whereas Bishop Blackburn had no such knowledge.
IV.

THE FACTS ADDUCED BY PLAINTIFF FALL FAR SHORT OF THOSE
REQUIRED FOR THE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The case of Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644

P.2d 577 (Ore. Ct. App. 1983) involved an alleged intentional
infliction of emotional distress and the Oregon Court observed:
Although it is ordinarily for the trier of
fact to determine not only the historical
facts, but also whether the offensiveness of
the defendant's conduct may reasonably be
regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to
permit recovery, if the minds of reasonable
men would not differ on the subject the
court is obliged to grant an order of
involuntary nonsuit.
The facts of that case were that a "convert" to
Scientology, after withdrawing from the same, sought to recover
damages for severe emotional distress alleging that she had been
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deprived of freedom to voluntarily act.
elements said to be required, to wit;

The court treated three
(1) intent, (2) conduct

which is outrageous or beyond the limits of social toleration,
and (3) resultant severe emotional distress.

It observed in its

decision that throughout the period of time the plaintiff had
been involved with Scientology she had held a job, visited her
parents, and had many contacts with non-Scientologists.

The

court dismissed the action and stated:
Whether viewed as individual acts or taken
together as a scheme we find nothing in this
record which constitutes conduct which is
beyond the limits of social toleration.
There is no evidence that plaintiff was
threatened or forced to remain involved in
Scientology.
The Oregon Court treats the same basic elements which the
court must find to exist in the present fact situation to
justify recovery on the basis of "intentional infliction of
emotional distress".

Bishop Blackburn, in providing

transportation funds for Michael Chandler to fly to North
Carolina, believing that he had received an authentic written
permission note from Michael's natural mother, cannot reasonably
be said to have the intent to inflict emotional distress.
The Utah case of Sams v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah
1961), involved facts wherein the plaintiff claimed she had been
subjected to severe emotional distress by the persistent,
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indecent and immoral proposals of the defendant that she have
sexual intercourse with him.

This court stated:

Our studies of the authorities and of the
arguments advanced, convinces us that
conceding such a cause of action may not be
based on mere negligence, but the best
considered view recognizes an action for
severe emotional distress though not
accompanied by bodily impact or physical
injury where the defendant intentionally
engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff
(a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional
distress, or (b) where any reasonable person
would have known that such would result; and
his actions are of such a nature as to be
considered outrageous and intolerable in
that they offend against the generally
accepted standards of decency and morality.
It is submitted that the facts of the instant case do not
even approach the requirements for an action for severe
emotional distress as set forth in that case.
This cause of action requires an intent to do an act
which the actor knows, or should know, will reasonably result in
harm.

In this regard the case of Matheson v. Pearson cited in

connection with the previously numbered argument is apropos and
as a matter of law the conduct cannot be considered
intentional.

Nor, was the Bishop's conduct "outrageous" or

"beyond the limits of social toleration".

Further, his conduct

did not result in "severe emotional distress" as evidenced by
Mrs. White's deposition testimony wherein she conceded that she
assumed because Michael was with friends or his brother that he
was safe.
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Restatement of Torts 2d § 46 (1965) states the following
with respect to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress:
It has not been enough that the defendant
has acted with an intention which is
tortious or even criminal or that he
intended to inflict emotional distress or
even that his conduct has been characterized
by 'malice1 or a degree of aggravation which
would entitle the plaintiff to punitive
damages for another tort. Liability has
been found only where the conduct has been
so outrageous in character and so extrcsme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds
of decency and to be regarded as atrocious
and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community. Generally, the case is one in
which the recitation of the facts to an
average member of the community would arouse
his resentment against the actor and lead
him to exclaim 'outrageous1.
The Oregon court in Christofferson v. Church of
Scientology, op. cit., modified the language of the Restatement
as follows:
We need a simpler test, and think it best
for this case to merely hold that the
conduct must be outrageous in the extreme.
It is our impression that the test for
liability in these cases can only be worked
out on a case-by-case basis. Here we must
determine whether defendant's conduct was so
extreme as to warrant the imposition of
liability for any severe emotional distress
caused thereby.
As previously noted, the Oregon court entered a nonsuit against
the plaintiff.
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In Lewis v. The Holy Spirit Assn. 589 F.Supp. 10 (Dist.
Mass. 1983) plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant
church of Reverend Moon engaged in "brain washing and
indoctrination".

The action was dismissed on defendant's

motion, the court stating:
Even if intended as the 'recognized tort of
intentional infliction of emotional
distress' in order to prove same the
plaintiff would be required to show that
defendant knew or should have known that
distress would result to the plaintiff from
its conducts; that the conduct was extreme
and outrageous beyond all possible bounds of
decency; that the defendant's acts caused
plaintiff's distress, and that no reasonable
person would be expected to endure such
conduct.
The federal court determined that the plaintiff had failed to
allege such facts as would give rise to such cause of action.
Plaintiff cites McBride v. Magnuson, 578 P.2d 1259 (Ore.
1978) as authority.

In the McBride case a mother was deprived

of the custody of an eight month old child where a police
officer was alleged to have maliciously and without probable
cause, caused the child to be placed in protective custody.

A

trial court had granted a demurrer on the grounds that the
police officer was immune from suit.

The appellate court

reversed holding that the case should go to trial.

The

distinction between that case and the instant one is obvious.
Bishop Blackburn did not act "maliciously" or "without probable
cause".

His position was consistent in that he would not give
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Michael transportation money without the consent of the mother
which he believed he had finally obtained.

Further, there is a

considerable distinction in depriving a mother of an eight month
old child and a few weeks separation of a mother from her
seventeen year old son.
Another case cited by Plaintiffs is that of State v.
Tritt, P.O., 463 P.2d 806 (Utah 1970).

In that case the

defendant had provided a minor with prescriptions allowing him
access to an excessive quantity of amphetamines and barbiturates
and had made no efforts to determine whether the minor was a
juvenile which provided the basis for a finding that the
defendant was guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor as against defendantfs contention that there was no
showing of necessary criminal intent.

It is submitted that this

case is easily distinguished in that the providing of an
excessive amount of drugs to a minor would almost certainly
cause harm while the furnishing of expense money to a 17 year
old to make a flight to North Carolina with the purported
consent of the mother suggests no probable harm.
Another case cited by Plaintiff is Grimsby v. Sampson,
530 P.2d 291 (Wash. 1975) where a doctor and hospital were sued,
the complaint alleging that the physician recklessly and
wantonly ignored the Plaintiff's wife and allowed her to "die
right in front of his eyes".

The court found in Grimsby that
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the issue before it was whether it can be said that "there was
no state of facts which Plaintiff could prove entitling him to
relief under his claim".

The court found that there might exist

under the alleged facts sufficient evidence to proceed to trial
based upon the following requirements:
(1) emotional distress must be intentional
or recklessly inflicted, (2) the conduct of
the defendant must be outrageous and
extreme, (3) there must exist severe
emotional distress, (4) plaintiff must be an
immediate family member and be present at
the time of such conduct.
It is submitted that none of the those elements exist in the
instant case.

V.

DEFENDANTS1 CONDUCT DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR A
FINDING OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
In the recent case of Johnson v. Rogers and Newspaper

Agency Corporation, 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, (1988) this court made
some modification of the law respecting the tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress.

The court departed from the

previously recognized law to the effect "it is well established
in Utah that a cause of action for emotional distress may not be
based upon mere negligence".
(Utah 1982).

See Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93

The Court observed:

Virtually all jurisdictions in the United
States now recognize a broad protected
interest in mental tranquility first
acknowledged in Utah in Jeppsen v. Jensen,
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47 Utah at 543, (155 P. at 431). The
negligent infliction of emotional distress
as a separate tort (distinct from the
'willful and wanton' infliction of emotional
distress or the negligent infliction of
physical injuries with concomitant emotional
injuries) has evolved rapidly only since the
1960's (citing authorities). A common fact
pattern for the cause of action is that
existing in this case: a bystander observes
negligent injury to a victim which causes
the bystander to suffer emotional distress.
The courts have developed several rules
affecting recovery for the emotional
distress. Currently, no jurisdiction
precludes recovery under any circumstances.
Recovery is based upon the satisfaction of
one of three standards: the impact rule,
the zone-of-danger rule, or a foreseeability
standard.
A discussion of the rule of law to be
applied must be general because the facts of
this case would satisfy any of the three
major tests applied in other jurisdictions.
The Plaintiff here suffered an impact during
the accident, receiving physical injuries to
his foot. Furthermore, he was in the
immediate zone of danger created by Rogers'
acts. Finally, all three of the Dillon
criteria are present: he was located
immediately at the scene of the accident, he
saw and heard all of the events associated
with the violence to the victim, and that
victim was his child.
The writer goes on to state:
I would hold that one may recover for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress
when one was in the zone of danger created
by the negligence and suffered a physical
impact. I, nevertheless, express the view
that the less arbitrary, more traditional
tort analysis embodied in the Dillon rule
(forseeability) is appropriate. It is true
that Dillon is more flexible than the impact
and zone of danger rules but it is not
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entirely free from the criticism that it,
too, has become hardened and mechanical in
practice because the courts in attempting to
apply it have no general policies to guide
them in the difficult cases. If there is a
rule which can determine liability in a more
policy-oriented and less arbitrary manner
while still drawing a line short of
unlimited liability, such a rule should be
adopted. A clear rule needs a clear
rationale.
The concurring opinion in Johnson v. Rogers, supra,
(joined in by three other Justices, thus constituting a
majority) observes that the writer of the main opinion, while
surveying the law of other states, declines to choose from among
the various possible rules because "all seem satisfied in this
case".

The concurring opinion goes on to state:
We cannot permit every claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress to go to a
jury under such varying standards as each
trial judge may choose. We have a practical
obligation to articulate understandable
standards and to impose workable limits for
use in the Utah courts. In the exercise of
that function, I think it best to adopt as
the test for determining liability for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress
the standards set forth in Section 313 of
the Restatement (2d) of Torts (1965) as
explained in the comments accompanying that
section.
The section from the Restatement of Torts referred to

requires:
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes
emotional distress to another, he is subject
to liability to the other for resulting
illness or bodily harm if the actor
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(a) should have realized that his
conduct involved an unreasonable risk of
causing the distress, otherwise than by
knowledge of the harm or peril of a third
person, and
(b) from facts known to him, should
have realized that the distress, if it were
caused, might result in illness or bodily
harm.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) has no
application to illness or bodily harm of
another which is caused by emotional
distress arising solely from harm or peril
to a third person, unless the negligence of
the actor has otherwise created an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the
other.
The conduct of Bishop Blackburn does not meet the
criteria set forth in the Restatement and favored by a majority
of this court.
VI.

NO ACTION FOR CLERICAL MALPRACTICE IS RECOGNIZED IN
THIS STATE
Plaintiff's Complaint sets forth a theory denominated

"clerical malpractice".

Defendants contend that no such cause

of action exists within the State of Utah.

The leading case

cited by Plaintiff in her brief is that of Nally v. Grace
Community Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Cal. App.
1984), which case is pending on appeal before the California
Supreme Court.

That case involved the alleged misconduct of a

pastor of a protestant church in failing to refer a young man
who exhibited suicidal tendencies for counseling by a therapist
"authorized and specially suited to prevent suicide".
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The

District Court had entered nonsuit against the plaintiff but the
Court of Appeals held that the evidence that the church's
counselors breached their duty as "non-therapist counselors" was
sufficient to overcome a nonsuit motion.
Nally II really supports an action for

The key as to whether
"clerical or clergy

malpractice" is found in the very first paragraph of the opinion
of the California Court of Appeals.

That paragraph reads:

This is the second time around in the
appellate courts for this case. The first
opinion generated a veritable fire storm of
controversy in the nation's law reviewers.
They called it the 'seminal1 case in a new
cause of action most frequently labeled
'clergy malpractice'. This court, however,
does not view the causes of action discussed
in our opinion to involve 'clergy
malpractice'. Instead we see them more
accurately characterized as 'negligent
failure to prevent suicide' and 'intentional
or reckless infliction of emotional injury
causing suicide'--which negligent and
intentional or reckless acts happen to have
been committed by church-affiliated
counselors. In our view this case has
little or nothing to say about the liability
of clergymen for the negligent performance
of their ordinary ministerial duties or even
their counseling duties except when they
enter into a counseling relationship with
suicidal individuals.
Obviously the instant case does not involve the
counseling of suicidal individuals, and thus Nally II is
inapropos if intended to support a new cause of action for
clergy malpractice.

-31-

Plaintiff in her brief argues that Nally II is authority
for the proposition that a reasonable clergyman, such as Bishop
Blackburn, would have referred the "family and/or Mike to
professionals trained to solve the difficulty".

(Plaintiff's

Brief, p. 30) rather than assist the boy to remove to another
place.

Plaintiff cites the decision in Nally II, requesting

this court to "remove the word "suicidal" from the "principle of
law which found a duty on the pastor as enunciated in that
case."

Defendants contend that such a proposal is stretching

Nally II far beyond its intent.

Plaintiff recognizes the First

Amendment difficulties in a civil court restricting or
circumscribing pastoral counseling.

Her brief on this appeal

states at page 31:
No First Amendment difficulties are
presented by White's allegation because the
Court will not be inhibiting or directing
Bishop Blackburn's ecclesiastical
performance and counseling. He is, and
necessarily should be, free to continue to
counsel Chandler and other church members
spiritually.
But the argued for "duty to refer" which Plaintiff
maintains Nally II establishes, when applied to the instant case
does amount to a proscription of Bishop Blackburn's exercise of
his judgment as a spiritual leader in determining whether there
was sufficient evidence to indicate a serious problem in the
White home, particularly involving Michael Chandler and his
stepfather, and whether that problem might be resolved (with the
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consent of the mother) by assisting Michael in finishing his
high school education in another state.

It seems that the same

First Amendment arguments which have been raised by the authors
of various law review articles pertain to the instant fact
situation and that a civil court should not interfere with
Bishop Blackburn's judgment as to whether (1) Michael was
telling him the truth, (2) it would be of benefit to Michael and
his mother that the church assist Michael in removing to another
state to complete his education, and (3) the consent requested
by Bishop Blackburn as a condition to Church assistance was
sufficient.

None of these judgments dictate a referral to a

professional.
Nally II and other trial court actions filed in Florida,
Ohio and Washington led to a treatment of the theory of "clergy
malpractice" in two excellent law review articles.
"Made Out of Whole Cloth?

See Comment,

A Constitutional Analysis of the

Clergy Malpractice Concept."

19 Cal. W. Law Rev. 507; also

Article, "Clergyman Malpractice, Ramifications of a New Theory",
16 Valpariso University Law Rev., 163 (1981).
The foregoing law review articles point out that in order
for there to be a finding of negligence on the part of the
cleric there must be, among other things, a duty owing the
plaintiff by the defendant.

Even if there were a duty, it is a

moral duty and not a legal duty and a breach thereof would have

-33-

no legal consequences.
are not enforceable.

Moral obligations, if they are breached,
As stated in the California Western Law

Review comment:
To the extent a pastor's duty is derived
from his religious ministry, it is not the
proper function of the court to judge the
cleric's conduct of his mission.
Sometimes the existence of a duty can be determined from
applicable statutes.

Our Utah Legislature has not seen fit to

put any restrictions on religious counseling nor is it likely
that the Legislature would adopt such restrictions in view of
the strong constitutional pronouncements guaranteeing freedom of
worship.
The principal difficulty with the clergy malpractice
concept is that the plaintiff asks the court to determine that
the defendant has failed to conform to a judicially established
standard of care which would regulate religious counseling.
Proponents of the theory have argued that the court should adopt
the standards of the psychotherapy professions for measuring
clergyman conduct.

The plaintiff apparently perceives the

function of religious and psychological counseling as similar.
The commentator in the California Western Law Review article
points out the valid distinction as follows:
When the peculiar conduct involved in
pastoral counseling is so defined
(interaction with the holy spirit) and
understood, it is readily apparent that
reference to scientifically or medically
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based forms of counseling to develop a
standard of care is inapt.
In religious teaching and counseling one communicates
religious beliefs and insights to assist the listener with
day-to-day problems.

One cannot separate the counseling or

teaching from its philosophical basis.

Regulation of religious

activity is particularly suspect if that regulation involves any
evaluation of underlying religious beliefs, United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) and regulation of religious
communication is constitutionally forbidden.

See Wooley v.

Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West.Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

Any attempt at

regulating religious teaching and counseling by requiring a
religious practitioner to conform to a judicially established
standard of care would violate the constitutional freedoms of
speech and religion.

Hence clerical malpractice has not been

generally recognized as a legal cause of action.
The concluding paragraph of the California Western Law
Review article previously cited is as follows:
It seems highly probable a civil court's
enforcement of a standard of care of
pastoral counseling will harm the
constitutional rights of the clergy and the
counselees by abridging their freedom under
the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. It seems equally probable that
such regulation would violate the
constitutional mandate of Church-State
separation and present the courts with
serious questions of public Policy. The
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considerations substantially outweigh
whatever possible benefit an individual may
obtain in such a suit. Accordingly, the
defense as proposed in this comment, based
on constitutional premises and public policy
should be recognized as applicable in future
malpractice litigation.
Likewise, the Valpariso article concludes as follows:
The law of torts has been the battleground
for social theory. Each new theory raises
far more questions than answers and the
theory of clergyman malpractice is no
exception. Since clergyman malpractice
inevitably deals with doctrinal,
ecclesiastical, and spiritual issues,
judicial review will force the courts into
dangerous territory. Thus, with the
possible exception of the instance where
'actual malice1 on the part of the counselor
is alleged to exist, it seems clear that the
First Amendment will bar the introduction of
this theory into the legal arena.
The District Court in his Memorandum Decision, R. 207, II
4 states:
Even if there were an action recognized in
Utah for clerical malpractice, the acts of
defendant would not raise to that level. In
this particular case you do not have
defendant Blackburn attempting to advise Mr.
Chandler in matters that should have been
referred to a professional such as a
psychiatrist, psychologist, or a physician,
or even a spiritual leader.
The court believes that to impose legal
standards upon the religious teachings of
the various denominations would undermine
the religions of the world and violate the
constitutional freedoms of speech and
religion.
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The District Court likened the issue of "clerical
malpractice" to that of loss of consortium as discussed in Greg
Hackford and Sherri Hackford v. Utah Power & Light, 59 Utah Adv.
Rpts. 21, observing that:
The Court, in its opinion (in Hackford)
indicates that if causes of action such as
argued by the plaintiff are to be created
anew in Utah, it should be done by the
legislature.
To illustrate that imposing liability upon a pastoral
counselor for "negligent failure to refer" substantially burdens
the exercise of religion, these defendants propose that at least
six distinct burdens would affect the exercise of religion by
individual pastors, by the institutions they serve and by the
people they counsel.
First, and perhaps most important the "duty effectively
to refer" suggested by the plaintiff would seriously undermine
the confidentiality of the counseling relationship between a
pastor and any individual who is severely depressed or who has,
as in Nally II, suicidal tendencies.

Confidentiality is an

essential ingredient of the trust that must exist in a
successful counseling relationship in the Mormon Church, as
elsewhere.

But under the court's decision in Nally II and

Plaintiff's proposed theory, if the counselee will not see a
psychotherapist voluntarily, the counselor must convey his
concerns about the counselee to a psychotherapist, the mental
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health authorities, or to the parishioner's family.

It is not

enough for a counseling pastor merely to encourage a potentially
suicidal individual, as in Nally II, to see a licensed
psychotherapist.

This duty requiring the pastor to convey

information about the parishioner to third parties, a duty that
California courts have wisely chosen not to impose upon licensed
therapists (See Bellah v. Greenson, 146 Cal. Rptr. at p. 539)
makes it impossible for the pastor to assure the necessary
degree of confidentiality and may, in turn, deter those with
suicidal tendencies from seeking counseling at all.

The state

created breach of confidentiality required by Nally II could
effectively destroy much pastoral counseling.
The second burden on religion created by the rule
articulated in Nally II is the threat of litigation.

The costs

of modern day litigation are prohibitive for most pastors.

They

are especially burdensome to volunteer pastors—like Mormon
Bishops—whose professional interests lie elsewhere.

But even

more than the costs of litigation the specter of having to
answer to a judge or jury for action taken or statements made
during counseling would terrify even the most competent
counsellor.

That fear would have a tendency to discourage any

counseling at all; at the very least, it would encourage the
pastor to "water down" his message so as to reduce the
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likelihood of offending the sensibilities of a future judge or
jury.
The chilling effect of potential litigation on the extent
and content of pastoral counseling is likely to be particularly
acute under a negligence standard.

A negligence suit

necessarily subjects pastors' exercise of judgment (as opposed
to intentional conduct) to second guessing by judges and
juries.

The application of any negligence standard is

inherently uncertain and imprecise, depending as it does upon a
judge or jury's determination after the fact, of (a) the
standard of care to which a reasonably prudent pastor would
conform under similar circumstances, and (b) whether the pastor
met that standard.

This uncertainty creates a burden on

religion analagous to that in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 305-07 (1940).
Just as a licensing requirement giving wide discretion to
the licensing officer in that case was found likely to "chill"
the exercise of the right to engage in religious solicitation,
so too the possibility that a pastor's decisions will be subject
to review by judges and juries under an uncertain standard of
conduct "chills" the right to engage in pastoral counseling.
The third burden which the United States Supreme Court
recognized as a significant burden on religion in Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (1987) is simply
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the "fear of potential liability" (See Amos at p. 2868).

The

fear of liability under the theory created by Nally II is
particularly well founded, since application of that theory will
often amount to strict liability for suicide.

As already noted,

the duty imposed by the Court of Appeals is not merely the duty
to refer a suicidal individual to a licensed psychotherapist,
but a duty effectively to refer.

240 Cal. Rptr. at 226.

The

pastor, however, has no way to compel the counselee to see a
licensed psychotherapist.

If the counselee will not see a

psychotherapist voluntarily, the only way a counselor can
fulfill his or her "duty of effective referral" is to succeed in
convincing a psychotherapist or the counselee1s relatives to
initiate involuntary commitment proceedings on nothing but the
strength of the counselor's description of the counsellee's
behavior and statements.

Jd. at 243-44.

If the counselor does

not succeed in that endeavor, he or she will likely face a
lawsuit in which the only real question is whether the suicide
was foreseeable to the counselor.

See Id. at 226-27.

But if a

suicide has, in fact, taken place, there will almost always be
some evidence from which a judge or jury can infer forseeability.
The fourth burden on religion created by Nally II is a
substantial intrusion into church autonomy.

Any tort liability

for religious activities by pastors necessarily creates
governmental standards of conduct.
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These standards, in turn,

require religious institutions to change the ways they train
their pastors, thereby interfering with the institutions
constitutional right to regulate their own affairs and to be
"independent from secular control or manipulation".
St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).

Kedroff v.

Several

decisions of the United States Supreme Court have recognized
that such interference constitutes a substantial, and in most
instances, constitutionally unacceptable burden on religion.
See Kedroff, supra, (interference in disputes over church
government); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976) (same); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U.S. 490 (1979) (interference with ecclesiastic control of
church schools); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,
107 S.Ct. 2862 (interference with church employment policies).
The particular liability theory created by Nally II,
moreover, carries an unusual potential for intrusion into the
autonomy of religious institutions.

In order to avoid

liability, churches must engage in suicide prevention training
and must also sometimes commit suicidal people to institutions.
And, as the trial judge stated:
The court would by necessity . . . have to
set standards of competence, standards of
training of counselors, determine what may
or may not be counsel, determine if the
problems counselled were moral or mental and
monitor the counseling for all time to come.
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Fifth, the duties imposed by the court of appeal may be
inconsistent with the religious beliefs of a particular
institution or a particular pastor.

In the Nally II

case, for

example, Defendant Thomson expressed strong, religiously-based
opposition to psychological or psychiatric counseling under most
circumstances.

240 Cal. Rptr. at 244-45 and n.6.

And even if

an individual pastor has no specific religious objection, he or
she may nonetheless feel a religiously-based hesitance to refer
a parishioner to a professional psychologist since, as the trial
judge aptly put it, "clinical psychology and pastoral counseling
do not spring from the same well".
Finally, the mere existence of a legal duty compelling
pastoral counselors (who comprise the vast majority of
non-therapist counselors) to "refer" their seriously troubled
counselees to secular counselors suggests a state preference for
the latter over the former.

It tells ordinary citizens that in

the State's view people with serious emotional difficulties
should be seeing secular counselors rather than religious ones.
It thus represents an official, governmental judgment that
secular counseling is more effective than religious counseling.
Not only is that conclusion not supported by any evidence, it
also presents substantial constitutional difficulties because it
represents a governmental endorsement of the secular over the
religious.

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)
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(O'Connor J. concurring) (government can infringe religious
freedom by endorsing or disapproving religion); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67-69 (1985) (O'Connor J. concurring in
the judgment) (same).
These burdens chill the exercise of religion in several
different ways.

As the dissenting judge in Nally II recognized,

the majority's liability rule—including the duty effectively to
refer--"can only have a chilling effect on the giving of
counseling at all".

240 Cal. Rptr. at 243.

That rule will not

only discourage pastors from providing counseling it will also
discourage suicidal individuals from seeking it and perhaps even
more important, the court of appeals1 decision would "affect the
way an organization carries out what it understands to be its
religious mission", Amos/ supra, 107 S. Ct. at 2868, including
the content of its religious counseling.
VII.

ALTHOUGH IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THERE EXISTED A GENUINE
ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER BISHOP BLACKBURN WAS GUILTY
OF SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE IN FAILING TO PERSONALLY CONTACT
MRS. WHITE BEFORE PROVIDING FUNDS FOR HER SON TO GO TO
NORTH CAROLINA THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT
REGARDING HER DAMAGES CONSISTING ONLY OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS, WHICH ARE NOT COMPENSABLE
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, Mrs. White

testified that she had suffered no out-of-pocket expenses or
loss in connection with the incident complained of.

The Church

unit in North Carolina paid for Michael's transportation back to
Utah, there were no tutoring costs, Michael graduated from high
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school with some administrative help, there was no loss of
income to the family as a result of Michael's absence, no money
was sent to the families in North Carolina who hosted Michael
and there were no medical bills paid as a result of the
incident.

Plaintiff expressed the full extent of her damages in

Paragraph 19 of her Affidavit (R. 80):
As a result of Bishop Blackburn 'helping' my
son run away from home, I suffered terrible
mental distress and emotional upheaval.
As previously noted in this Brief, Bishop Blackburn's
conduct does not meet the criteria required by this court to
constitute the tort of "negligent infliction of emotional
distress", and since no other damage was suffered by Plaintiff
except the alleged "emotional distress", Plaintiff's theory of
simple negligence can result in no recovery as a matter of law.
VIII. PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE PER SE FAILS ON THE
FACTS
Plaintiff has not treated in her brief on appeal and,
thus, may have abandoned her fifth cause of action for
"negligence per se" which cause attempts to impose civil
liability upon the Defendants for the alleged violation of
78-3a-19, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, a section of the Juvenile
Court Act prohibiting any person 18 years of age or over from
encouraging "a child to leave the legal or physical custody of
any person in which the child lawfully resides" and makes such
conduct a Class B Misdemeanor.

That cause of action fails on
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the facts since Bishop Blackburn's conduct, as a matter of law,
cannot be interpreted as "wrongful encouragement of a child to
leave the legal or physical custody of any person".

Since

Bishop Blackburn thought he had a written consent from Michael's
natural mother, he acted in good faith thinking he was
performing a welfare service both for the boy and the mother who
presumably could not afford the transportation costs.

No civil

liability should attach under the facts of this case because of
the Bishop's good faith conduct.

In its Memorandum Decision the

District Court concluded that:
Defendant Blackburn was not negligent per se
for the reason that Defendant Blackburn did
not wrongfully encourage Mr. Chandler to
leave the custody of his mother. In fact,
Defendant Blackburn's acts were to assist in
reuniting the family at least temporarily.
The court does not question that Defendant
Blackburn's acts were done with good
intentions and not for the purposes set
forth in Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action."
(R. 208).
CONCLUSION
After reviewing the Affidavits and Depositions, the
District Court concluded that Plaintiff could not recover under
any of her proposed theories of liability.

This determination

was correct in that, in the absence of other evidence, had this
case come before a jury, the court would have correctly
nonsuited Plaintiff at the conclusion of her case.
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In such

circumstances the granting of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment was entirely proper.
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